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Faculty and Deans

LAWYER CREEDS AND MORAL SEISMOGRAPHY
James E. Moliterno*

Unquestionably, "popular respect for the legal profession is
steadily falling"; there is "much cause for discouragement and some
cause for alarm."1 "[L]awyers ... are blamed for some serious public
problems," including the enormous costs of increased litigation.2
"Year by year the various law schools send increasing armies of new
recruits, far beyond the requirements of even this litigious community."3 Lawyers act with "exaggerated contentious[ness],»4 as if they
were "gladiator[s]" in a war, making every effort to "wipe out the
other side."5 Among the causes of this crisis is the attitude that the
law is no longer a profession, but a mere competitive business in
which its members face increased "economic pressure[s]."6 Better
legal education may not even help because "[t]he evil ... is not so
much a professional as an American fault. It has its source in our
inordinate love for the almighty dollar."7
Without the footnotes, it takes some care to distinguish the previous paragraph's turn of the twentieth century quotations from its
turn of the twenty-first century quotations.8
Remember,

* James E. Molitemo is Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Skills
Program at the College of William & Mary. The production of this article was
supported by a William & Mary Law School summer research grant; considerable excellent research assistance was provided by Pamela Kultgen, Jon Nixon,
David Spooner, and Catherine Trinkle.
1. MORRIS GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 11-12 (1931).

2. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, ~ .. In the Spirit of Public Service:' A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 253
(1986) [hereinafter Blueprint].
3. 10 THE LAW STUDENT'S HELPER 35 (Sprague 1902) (on file with the
author).
4. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted in 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 406 (1906).
5. Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does "Hardball" Litigation Produce the Best Result for Your Client?, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 24, 26 (quoting
a local bar president).
6. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 261.
7. Proceedings of the Association of American Law Schools 11 (1906)
[hereinafter 1906 AALS Proceedings].
8. Facts are always perceived within the context of their times; today's
perceived problems are not always tomorrow's. For example, in 1959, an ABA
Special Committee on the Economics of Law Practice concluded that the major
problem facing the profession was that too few people were entering the law
schools.
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"[d]issatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as the
law," raising issues of professional decline with some regularity. 9
Some incivility among lawyers has always existed and inevitably always will. The lawyer's role in the adversarial system by its
nature puts the lawyer in the midst of strongly partisan and sometimes emotionally charged activity. Human nature dictates that no
matter how honorable a lawyer might be, some combative conduct
will occasionally occur.:10 Once again, however, as a moral shift is
occurring in the American legal profession and the society within
which it exists, the profession is wringing its hands hoping to find a
solution to this "problem." A major piece of the profession's solution
to the current crisis has been the adoption of professionalism
creeds.
INTRODUCTION

Professionalism creeds are sweeping the nation. At a time
when Rule 11 sanctions abound, when the definition of "hardball
litigation" is debated, and when the bar conducts seminars on
dealing with the S.O.B. lawyer, bar associations across the nation
are racing to adopt good manners oaths. 11 But are these developments solely the result of a decaying moral fabric among lawyers?
Might there also be an inherent, cause and effect relationship between changes in the nature, format and tone of the American Bar
Association's (ABA) model ethics pronouncements and the rise of
the voluntary, aspirational creeds? What will happen if, as has
been indicated in recent decisions, courts or bar association disciplinary committees begin to enforce these voluntary, aspirational
creeds?12 And, whether enforceable or not, upon what should these
creeds be based?
The practice and the bar have changed dramatically, in some
ways undoubtedly for the worse, but in other ways for the better,
since the days of David Hoffman's aspirational resolutions, 13 elitist

9. Pound, supra note 4, at 395.
10. See Susan Davis, Burnout, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 48 (reporting the
nature of stress and burnout that are implicit in the legal profession); Warren
E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62 ("We Americans are
a competitive people and that spirit has brought us to near greatness. But that
competitive spirit gives rise to conflicts and tensions."); Milo Geyelin, Courtroom Rudeness Has Americans Pining for Civil Litigation, WAI.:L ST. J. EUR.,
July 9, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL-WSJE 2026228 (suggesting that the
adversarial system is incompatible with civility).
11. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989).
For a discussion of the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism,
see infra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of recent court decisions enforcing creeds, see infra

Part II.
13. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (Arno Press 1972)
(1836).
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bar admission policies,14 and client and self-interested drafting and
adoption of legal ethics rules. 15 Indeed, among the first impeti to
have bar associations was the fear that the children of southern and
eastern European immigrants and other undesirables were going to
infiltrate the club. 16 The organized bar, happily, can no longer rely
on the homogeneity of its membership and its membership's virtually common, elitist upbringing to ensure maintenance of its definition of civility among the group's members. To the extent the new
creeds are merely a hoped-for return to the moral force of formerly
common values in the membership's actions toward each other, toward the court, and toward its clients, the creeds are bound to fail
and to retard the progress toward pluralism of the profession in the
process.
The reality is that lawyers in the golden age17 were not civil to
fellow lawyers who were outside of their own socioeconomic group
and practice orientation. To the extent that lawyers were more civil
in the golden age than they are today, that former civility only existed within a commonly interested group oflawyers who had essentially agreed not to compete with one another for clients,18 and who
together formed a profession-ruling class that recognized the enemy, to whom they were anything but civil, as all lawyers who
looked or spoke or thought differently from them. Not coincidentally, at some of these historical junctures, the outsider's clients
were largely people who had claims against the clients of the profession's ruling class. 19 Civility has, at various times in the history of
the American legal profession, been what members of particular
practice cohorts gave to one another, but not to those members of
the profession who were outside the cohort. During such times, outsiders of one description or another have been the object of uncivil
conduct by the most well-established members of the profession.20
The perceived need by both the public and the profession21 for
enhanced ethics in the legal profession is the basis for acceptance by
14. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 94-101.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 107-09. For a discussion of bar associations' history of discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnicity, class, and family background, see infra Part III.B.
17. A "golden age" is a moving target, probably corresponding to the fifty
years preceding the professional memory of those currently in the practice, estimated today to be from roughly 1900 to 1950.
18. See HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 5, 190-191 (Greenwood Press
1980) (1953); GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS § 324, at 205-06
(1902).
19. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 44-48.
20. See id.
21. For an analysis of the differences between the public's view and the
profession's view of the current problems, see Deborah Rhode, Lawyers: The
Public's View and the Profession's View, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
1997).
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both lawyers and non-lawyers of a need for professionalism creeds.
What is far less clear is whether a return to the civility of the past
actually represents the higher ethical standard that its proponents
would have the profession and public believe it to be.22
Lawyers, as well as the public, recognize the need for more integrity and civility in the legal profession. Some lawyers blame the
decline in lawyer civility on incessant hardball among lawyers.23
Hardball, according to Chicago lawyer Philip Corboy, "is when a
lawyer, whether plaintiff's or defense, is personally antagonistic or
insistent on all of the procedural rules being followed." 24 Defining
"antagonistic or insistent," however, is not easy. Given a lawyer's
unquestioned ducy to his or her client, characterizing "insistence" as
a negative attribute is hardly a proposition that is universally accepted.25
The hardball approach, some assert, arises from the transition
in the minds of many lawyers that lawyering is now as much a
business as a profession. A bottom-line mentality of "win-at-anycost" often exacerbates tensions in lawyer relationships.26 But this
so-called mind-set change is not of recent origin. Rather, it has accompanied times of prior professionalism crises.27
The profession may, in fact, need lawyer creeds to fill an aspirational niche. According to a survey commissioned by the ABA, public perception of lawyers is relatively unfavorable. 28 The survey
suggested, for instance, "a disturbing pattern that the more a person knows about the legal profession and the more he or she is in
direct personal contact with lawyers, the lower an individual's
opinion of them."29 When asked to volunteer in their own words
22. See Burger, supra note 10, at 62; Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251.
23. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1987, at
48, 51.
24. Id. at 48; see also Daniel J. Lehmann, Church Plays Legal Hardball,
Cm. SUN TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 14 (describing Catholic Church litigation tactics); Carole Bass, Playing Litigation Hardball, CoNN. L. TruB., Jan. 2, 1995, at
1 (describing US Surgical's 200 hour deposition of opposing party); Randall
Samborn, Priest Playing Hardball to Battle Abuse Charges, NAT'L L.J., July 4,
1994, at A1 (discussing priest's litigation tactics in sex abuse case); Stanley S.
Arkin, Blackmail and the Practice of Law, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 7, 1995, at 3
(discussing use of blackmail as a legal tactic); MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF
ON UNFAIR TACTICS (2d ed. 1988) (discussing tactics for playing hardball in lawsuits).
25. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 23, at 52; MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETmCS 6-10 (1990); ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 182-84 (2d ed. 1955).
26. Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics
Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 654 n.89 (1990).
27. See id. at 639-42 (discussing the author's experiences with aggressive
lawyers as a practicing attorney from 1948 through 1964, and from 1977
through 1979); 1906AALS Porceedings, supra note 7, at 10-11.
28. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 60-61.
29. Id. at 62.
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changes that should be made in the legal profession, the largest
segment of respondents-twenty-two percent-suggested improvements in ethics, integrity, and accountability.30 These responses
suggest that lawyer creeds would be supported by the public, and
that the profession would benefit by articulating properly framed
and based aspirations and then fulfilling them. But again, history
reminds us that the public has before blamed increases in litigiousness on lawyers rather than on the cultural and societal changes
that have largely spawned the grounds for the litigation increase.31
The current wave of creeds may be little more than a natural
outgrowth of the change in tone of the ABA model ethics pronouncements.32 The change of ABA model ethics pronouncements
and their adoption by the states over the twentieth century have
made the rise of the modern creeds all but inevitable. The new
creeds are, however, inappropriate and unwise bases for disciplinary or judicial sanctions enforcement because they are valuable
only as aspiration and because many of the current creeds are erroneously and dangerously based on a pragmatic, client-interest rationale and are reflective of a past era's false civility.33 If the profession will inevitably have creeds, and hopefully unenforceable ones,
the current crop is ill conceived. They are to too great an extent a
harkening back to a happily-lost moral basis for the profession that,
if it ever was, is no longer dominant. To create a creed that would
be useful beyond its public relations effects, a new, more inclusive,
less elitist, moral basis must be found for the profession that can
serve as the creed's foundation. 34

I.

A HISTORY OF CODES AND CREEDS

A

Colonial and Pre-Colonial Lawyer Ethics Pronouncements
As early as the fourteenth century, lawyers were being held to a
high ethical standard.35 An English statute of 1403 mandated that
attorneys admitted to the bar be "virtuous, learned, and sworn to do
their duty."36 Furthermore, these fifteenth century attorneys were
required to take an oath pledging that they would "be good and vir-

30. See id. at 64.
31. See CHARLES WARREN, A HisTORY OF THE .AMERICAN BAR 214-16 (William
S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1911) (recounting the popular opinion regarding the sharp
increase in debt collection following the American Revolution).
32. For a discussion of the ABA's movement from aspiration to mandate in
its ethics pronouncements, see infra Part I.C.
33. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of creeds relying on a past era,
see infra Part III.B.
34. For a discussion of the creation of a new creed, see infra Part III.C.
35. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 24.
36. Id. at 26.
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tuous, and of good fame." 37 A 1729 statute required attorneys to
"swear, that I will truly and honestly demean myself in the practice
of an attorney, according to the best of my knowledge and ability." 38
These early oaths were a combination of minimum, enforceable
standards and aspiration. They were meant to set an enforceable
standard ofbehavior but were, in part, cast in aspirationallanguage
with a moral rather than pragmatic basis. The statutes were aimed
at admitting only good and virtuous men who worked according to
their best ability; the oaths aim at an ideal level of conduct and
move on moral terms beyond what is necessary to maintain a minimum acceptable level of behavior and competence.39
This English tradition was wholly embraced by colonial legislatures, which universally adopted the practice of swearing in attorneys.40 Colonies that adopted regulations prior to 1729 simply
41
stipulated that attorneys had to be "sworn in". Colonies that prescribed an attorney oath after 1729 adopted the English version almost verbatim.42 The colonies, then, thoroughly adopted the English tradition of adopting requirements that were a combination of
mandatory minimum standards and aspirational promises.

37. The Punishment of an Attorney Found in Default, 4 Hen. 4, ch. 18
(1402) (Eng.).
38. An Act for the Better Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors, 2 Geo. 2,
ch. 23, § 13 (1729) (Eng.).
39. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 43.
40. See id. at 53 (Maryland (1674)); id. at 72-73 (Massachusetts (1686)); id.
at 141, 218 (Rhode Island (1705)); id. at 130 (Connecticut (1708)); id. at 121
(South Carolina (1712)); id. at 139 (New Hampshire (1714)); id. at 109
(Pennsylvania (1726)); id. at 126 (Georgia (1731)); id. at 202 (Delaware (1741));
id. at 43 (Virginia (1748)); id. at 113 (New Jersey (1763)); id. at 125 (North
Carolina (1777)); id. at 295 n.1 (New York (1777)). In Virginia and several
other colonies, early attempts to regulate admission to the bar followed several
periods of prohibition of lawyering for fee. I d. at 40-42. Lawyers have been required to take oaths aimed at unusual ends: Rhode Island lawyers, for example,
were required to swear that they would accept paper money in payment of fees.
Id. at218.
41. See e.g., An Order for the Holding of Courts and the Execution of Justice, Mass. Stat. 1701-2, ch. 7, § 2 (photo. reprint 1976) (1686) (codified as
amended at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 221, § 38 (West 1958)).
42. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Practice of Attorneys, 22 Geo. 2, ch.
47 (1748) (Va.). Virginia amended its oath in 1785 but the text remained partly
mandatory and partly aspirational in character. An Act Regulating the Admission of Attorneys, 6 Va. Stat. 169, ch. 29 (1785). The statute stipulated that
only those of "good moral character" would be admitted to the bar. Id. The
oath reflected this motive:
You solemnly swear, that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court, and if you know of an intention to commit any
[you shall prevent it]: You will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any false, groundless, or unlawful suit ... ; you will delay no man
for lucre or malice; but will conduct yourself ... according to the best
of your knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity ....
I d.
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B. Hoffman and Sharswood Were Effectively the First American
Aspirational Creeds
Until the 1880s, when state bar associations began to adopt
comprehensive ethical standards, bar associations had not attempted to codify ethical standards except for attempts to regulate
bar admission standards, including educational requirements.43
Rather, the treatises and essays of David Hoffman44 and George
Sharswood45 "governed" the legal ethical culture in the loosest
sense. Both men adopted a primarily aspirational approach46-an
approach that exhorted the attorney to the nineteenth century gentleman-lawyer ideal. This ideal was grounded in a moral framework; their work put in print the attributes of the ideal lawyer the
earlier oaths had sought to require and mold. Hoffman's Resolution
XXXIII most clearly represented this morally based, aspirational
approach: ''If, therefore, there be among my brethren, any traditional moral errors of practice, they shall be studiously avoided by
me, though in so doing, I unhappily come in collision with what is
... too often denominated the policy of the profession.~
Other resolutions more specifically articulate this gentlemanlawyer ideal. Hoffman exhorted the attorney to "be always courteous" with professional brethren,48 and called for the lawyer to not
countenance "frivolous and vexatious defenses.~ Resolution XXXII
states: "I will never permit myself to enter upon a system of tactics
. . . by the most nicely balanced artifices of disingenuousness, by
mystery, silence, obscurity [and] suspicion . . . . Reputation gained
for this species of skill is sure to be followed by more than an
equivalent loss of character ...."50
The overall focus of Hoffman's Resolutions is on the profession,
the appropriate treatment of professional brethren, and the lawyer's
officer-of-the-court role. The client service ethic exists in Hoffman's
7

9

43. The earliest admission and educational standards did not stray from
the traditional primary goal of maintaining a high level of moral fitness. See
Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, in 1
A.B.A. REP. 209 (1878).
44. HOFFMAN, supra note 13.
45. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics (1854), reprinted in
32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1907).
46. Neither, of course, was writing in the first instance with any authority
to announce enforceable standards. Both, as it turned out, were in fact writing
what became with quite little modification the first purported bar ethics codes,
later to be incorporated into the 1908 ABA Canons. •see infra Part I. C.
47. HOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 765.
48. Id. at 752 (Resolution V).
49. Id. at 754 (Resolution X). Resolution XII exhorts the attorney to not
misuse the statute of limitations. Id.
50. Id. at 764-65. Resolution XLIX states that "(a]varice is one of the most
dangerous and disgusting of vices." Id. at 774.
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Resolutions, but is subordinate to devotion to the profession itself
and to the system of justice.51
The moral framework articulated by Hoffman was seized upon
by Judge George Sharswood. Sharswood's An Essay on Professional
Ethics52 clearly articulated the much-admired "gentleman-lawyer"
ideal, and served as an ethical beacon for lawyers for more than one
hundred years, first on its own and later as the model for most of
3
the early state ethics codes and then the 1908 ABA Canons.5 Sharswood's ethical precepts were not, of course, meant to be enforceable
norms, but they manifest the morallaspirational basis of nineteenth
century professional ethics.54 Sharswood began the section concerning the duties the lawyer owes to his professional brethren by
asserting that "[t]here is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the
sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law."55 He continued by citing with
approval the spirit of the traditional English oath.56 The explicit
ethical duties that Sharswood enunciated were aspirational in nature.57 Sharswood and Hoffman, taken together, clearly reflect the
profession's tradition that these ethical pronouncements exist not
primarily to ensure certain minimum standards of conduct, but to
exhort the lawyer to a certain level of ideal conduct. 58

C. Alabama Code Begins the Process; the ABA Moves from Creed
to Code and Aspiration to Mandate in its Successive Model
Pronouncements
Beginning in the late 1880s, state bar associations began to
adopt ethical codes that articulated existing professional norms.G 9
51. See id. at 752-55, 764 (Resolutions V, VII, XII, XIII, and XXXII).
52. Sharswood, supra note 45.
53. For a discussion of the early state ethics codes' and the 1908 ABA Canons' reliance on Sharswood's Essay, see infra Part I. C.
54. Sharswood's preface hints at the aspirational-moral bent of the ethics
rules to come: Discussing lawyer/legislators, Sharswood comments that
"[theirs] is the noblest work in which the intellectual powers of man can be engaged, as it resembles most nearly the work of the Deity." Sharswood, supra
note 45, at 10.
55. Id. at 55; see also id. at 55 (asserting that "high moral principle is [the]
only safe guide" for the young attorney).
56. Id. at 58.
57. See, e.g., id. at 74 (The attorney "should never unnecessarily have a
personal difficulty with a professional brother. He should never give nor pro·
voke insult.... Let him shun most carefully the reputation of the sharp practitioner").
58. The distinction is important, for these different rationales have a potent effect on their concomitant lega1/ethical cultures.
59. See Report of the Committee on Code ofProfessional Ethics, in 31 A.B.A.
REP. 676, 676-78 [hereinafter 1907 Committee Report]. The following states
drafted codes of ethics during the late 1880s to the early 1900s: Alabama in
1887, Georgia in 1889, Virginia in 1889, Michigan in 1897, Colorado in 1898,
North Carolina in 1900, Wisconsin in 1901, West Virginia in 1902, Maryland in
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The Alabama Code began the parade, and almost all other states
relied heavily on it when drafting their own ethics codes.60
The Alabama Code had had its own influence: Sharswood's
1854 Essay on Professional Ethics,61 originally delivered in part to
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where Sharswood was a
professor. "Anyone who is familiar with the little book by Judge
Sharswood on 'Legal Ethics' will readily see how large a part of this
[Alabama] code has been drawn from that source. Many of its
maxims have been transferred word for word from Sharswood's
treatise ...."62 Sharswood's Essay was "doubtless the inspiration
for the Alabama code."63 Not surprisingly, the Alabama code has
been described as "more a code of etiquette than ethics."64
In response to the states' movement, the ABA moved in 1905 to
formulate its own code of professional ethics.65 In 1907, the Committee on Professional Ethics, reporting the sources it was consulting for the forthcoming code, had Sharswood's treatise printed as an
addendum to the record of the annual meeting and had copies distributed to the general membership.56 In addition to Sharswood, the
Committee reported that it was primarily consulting the Alabama
Code,67 three attorney oaths,68 a Lawyer's Prayer,69 and David Hoffman's Resolutions. 70
The 1908 ABA Canons ofEthics,71 1ike the 1887 Alabama Code,
were, by design, similar to Hoffman's and Sharswood's works. In
fact, many portions of the Alabama Code actually appeared verba-

1902, Kentucky in 1903, and Missouri in 1906. See id. at 676. Although the
ethical standards thus became "official" policy, they were loosely, if ever, enforce. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 258.
60. See 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678 ("With the exception
of the Louisiana Code, all the State Bar Associations Codes are formulated, almost totidem verbis, upon that of Alabama ....").
61. Sharswood, supra note 45.
62. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678 (quoting the chairman of
the committee drafting Kentucky's code of ethics).
63. Id.
64. Michael Hegarty, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Commercial Speech-Attorney Solicitation-In Re Von Wiegen, 34 U. KAN. L. REV.
191, 194 (1985).
65. See Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, 28 A.B.A. REP. 3, 132 (1905).
66. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 680; Sharswood, supra note
45.
67. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678-79, app. B.
68. Id. at 678-79, apps. D, E, & I. The oaths were The LaWYer's Oath in
the State of Washington, id. app. D; The Oath for Advocates Prescribed by the
Laws of the Swiss Canton of Geneva, id. app. E; and The Oath Administered to
laWYers in Germany on Admission to the Bar of the Respective Monarchial
States, id. app. I.
69. Id. app. F.
70. Id. app. H.
71. CANONS OF ETHICS, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575 (1908).
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tim in the ABA Canons.72 The ABA's committee established to con-

sider the adoption of a code of professional ethics added the author
of the Alabama code, Judge Thomas Goode Jones,73 to the committee
as it began to draft its own canons of ethics.74 Consequently, Judge
Jones attended the three-day session from which the 1908 Code
emerged.75 Judge Jones's attendance likely made the influence of
the Alabama Code even greater.
Another, though lesser, influence on the ABA Canons was
David Hoffman's Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment,
fifty suggestions for lawyers included in his 1836 book on a general
course of study for lawyers.76 Both Sharswood's and Hoffman's
works were reprinted in the ABA Reports. Sharswood's Essay was
given its own volume within the Reports/7 and Hoffman's Resolutions appeared in the appendix to the ABA Report of the Committee
on Code of Professional Ethics.78 The basis of both the early state
codes and the ABA Canons, therefore, remained strongly moral and
aspirational.
With these strongly moral-based premises in mind,79 the ABA
promulgated its comprehensive Canons of Professional Ethics in
1908. The provisions of the Canons themselves often evince their
aspirational underpinnings.8° Canon 17 states: "Whatever may be
72. See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33
A.B.A REP. 567, 569 (1908) ("The foundation of the draft for canon of ethics,
herewith submitted, is the code adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association
in 1887 ....") [hereinafter 1908 Final Committee Report].
73. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678. Judge Jones was a
"confederate war hero, frontier judge and legislator, [and] eventually governor
of Alabama." Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U.
L. REV. 319, 321 (1987).
74. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 679.
75. See 1908 Final Committee Report, supra note 72, at 569.
76. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678-79.
77. Id. at 680; Sharswood, supra note 45.
78. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, app. H.
79. See Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (1908).
They [Hoffman and Sharswood] frequently seek to fortifY a canon of
conduct by subjoining an argument for following it. The reasons given
are generally those of policy. Follow it, they argue, because you will
succeed better in your profession if you do. . . . Be prompt and punctual, and it will strengthen your hold on your clients. The new code of
the American Bar Association makes no such appeals to motives of
expediency and self-advantage. It occupies a higher plane. Its canons
are left to rest on principles of right and honor.
Id. Baldwin was the initiator of the ABA in 1878. See Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (1997).
80. See 1908 Final Committee Report, supra note 72, at 574. Indeed, the
official text of the Code is preceded by the statements: 1) "Craft is the vice, not
the spirit of the profession," id. (quoting Edward G. Ryan); and 2) "Discourage
litigation," id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
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the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other
81
• • • •"
Canon 22 exhorts the attorney to always act with "candor
and fairness" in his professional dealings.82 With the 1908 Canons
of Ethics, the moral foundations of the "gentleman-lawyer" ideal
were articulated as the national profession's ideal. Despite this
code-like articulation, however, the moral, aspirational nature of
the prevailing ethical philosophy did not change: with advertising
and solicitation rules excepted, the Canons were not drafted in language of nor primarily intended to be applied as enforceable rules. 83
Virtually the only substantive changes from Hoffman and Sharswood to the Alabama code and then the ABA Canons relate to direct client-getting and contingent fees. These changes reflected a
largely self- and client-interested activity by the Canons' drafters
whose moral standards and clients' accounts were offended by the
pursuit of claims by injured plaintiffs against their corporate clients. Such claims would be far less likely to be brought if urban,
ethnic, underclass lawyers could be restrained from advertising
about their services, soliciting the business of injured persons, and
offering contingent fee arrangements to those unable to afford a
pay-as~you-go lawyer fee.
Although it is clear that many client-getting activities had long
been subject to disdain,84 the additions to the Canons regarding client-getting from the very limited mention of them in the Canons'
models-Sharswood and Hoffman-are striking in their reproval:
Canon 27 grudgingly approves of business cards as being "not per se
improper. But solicitation of business by ... advertisements, or by
personal communication ... is unprofessional. . . . [S]elf-laudation
... [is] intolerable."85 Thus, during the period leading up to and
then proceeding from the adoption of the 1908 Canons through the
next thirty years at least, the bar got stronger, not weaker, in its insistence on no advertising: in 1854 Sharswood said nothing about
81. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 17, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 580
(1908).
82. Id. Canon 22, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 581 (1908); see also id.
Canon 23, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908) ("Attitude Toward Jury");
id. Canon 29, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908) ("Upholding the
Honor of the Profession"); id. Canon 32, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 584
(1908) ("The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis").
83. The Canons were not meant to have the effect of positive law; they
would, however, come to be regarded as important guidelines for lawyer conduct the violation of which might lead to discipline. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 55 (practitioner's ed. 1986). By 1914, 30
states had adopted the ABA Canons "with little or no change." Report of the
Committee on Professional Ethics, 39 A.B.A. REP. 559, 560-61 (1914).
84. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 25; WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 14.2.2, at
776-77.
85. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 27, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 582
(1908).

792

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

advertising restrictions;86 in the 1880's the Alabama Code permitted
a fair amount of newspaper advertising.87 Warvelle allowed for
some as well.88 Some early writers professed to find tolerable even
in-person solicitation, though they would not engage in it personally.89 In the nineteenth century, testimonials of satisfied clients
were also reportedly used. 90 But since 1937, a year in which the
Canons were amended,91 "all such advertisement has been condemned."92
The 1908 Canons of Ethics were the principle touchstone for attorney conduct for many years. "A consensus grew among the bar,
however, that the Canons were incomplete, unorganized, and failed
to recognize the· distinction between the inspirational and the proscriptive."93 Consequently, the ABA promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.94 In 1983, the ABA adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a replacement for the 1969
Code.95
The 1908 Canons remained the official governing norm of the
legal profession until the ABA promulgated a comprehensive reformulation in 1969.96 Prior to the 1969 Model Code, the ethical norms
of the profession were largely rooted in the moral consensus of the
leaders of the organized bar. Thus, the ethical restrictions governing attorneys were largely aspirational97 rather than mandatory in
character. With the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility98-and
the subsequent Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disciplinary
86. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213.
87. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS Rule 16, reprinted in DRINKER, supra note 18, app.
F at356.
88. WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 86, at 52.
89. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213 (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE
OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 608 (Random House, Inc. 1950) (1791)).
90. See William L. Wheeler, Lawyer Advertising: The Way it Was in the
Good Old Days, ILL. B.J., Oct. 1978, at 90, 92-93.
9L See Proceedings of the House ofDelegates, in 62 A.B.A. REP. 216, 350-52
(1937).
92. DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213.
93. Don J. Young & Louise L. Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for Internal Control, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 205, 208 (1988).
94. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. REP. 728, 728 (1969).
95. See WOLFRAl\f, supra note 83, § 2.6.4, at 60-63 (discussing the criticism
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the ABA's subsequent
promulgation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
96. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. REP. 728, 729-30 (1969).
97. Pre-1969 norms of conduct were not codified futo a strict set of enforceable rules. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.2, at 55. This nonenforceable
nature enabled earlier codes to appeal to the attorney's moral suasions-they
were, therefore, aspirational.
98. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969), reprinted in 94
A.B.A. REP. 729 (1969). Within a few years, virtually every state had adopted
the ABA's Code. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 56.
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Proceedings99-the ABA sought for the first time to lobby state judicial systems to officially adopt and enforce the ABA's ethical framework.100 This fundamental change of purpose marked the beginning
of the shift from aspirational goals toward mandatory minimum
standards and rules. In order to make the 1969 Code palatablei.e., practically enforceable-the outwardly moral, almost purely aspirational stance of the 1908 Code had to be abandoned. 101 In the
attempt to establish minimum enforceable standards of behavior,
the ABA largely abandoned its moral rationale for promulgating its
code of ethics in the first place.102 The moral rationale and aspirational focus were retained in a more limited form in the Ethical
Considerations which followed each Canon and Disciplinary Rule in
the 1969 Code, but the Ethical Considerations were now meant to
provide "guidance"103 and were no longer considered essential attributes of the "good"104 attorney. Moral aspirations are largely absent from the 1983 Model Rules-the ethical culture of the legal

99. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, 104
A.B.A. REP. 373, 374 (1979).
100. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 56.
101. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 258. "The message [of the 1908 Code]
was lofty, but hard to enforce. If the Bar was to rid itself [of bad lawyers] ...
both more formal disciplinary procedures and more precise statements of professional standards were required." Id.; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Future ofLegal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1250-51 (1993). Hazard states that
[t]he Canons presupposed that right-thinking lawyers knew the
proper thing to do and that most lawyers were right-thinking. . . .
[T]he Canons had no direct legal effect ... [and] functioned not as enforceable legal standards but as evidence of such standards.
The transformation of the norms of professional conduct was principally effected by the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility ....
Id. Indeed, the Professionalism Report was itself a later attempt to replaced
the beginning-to-be-lost aspirational element of organized bar ethics pronouncements.
102. See JACK L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 63-64 (1988). Sammons stated that the evolution from the 1908 Canons to the 1969 Code to the
1983 Model Rules was
evolution from morals to ethics to ethical regulation to rules oflaw. It
is an evolution moving constantly in the direction of increasing coerciveness and, as it does, necessarily reducing the profession's guidance from aspiration to minimally acceptable conduct. We went very
quickly from what not to be to what not to do. . . . It is easy ... to confuse compliance with the rules with being moral and it is easy to confuse minimally acceptable conduct with acting as a professional."
ld. See also EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN LIGHT
OF AMERICAN LAw 38 (1966) (stating that legal codification can utilize a minimum-standards approach at the expense of the aspiration for an ideal form of
behavior).
103. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILITY pmbl. and preface
(1969).
104. See id.
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profession now wholly embraced a pragmatic minimum-standards

. 105
b aBlS.

In fact, the notion of an adopted, enforceable lawyer code is of
quite recent origin. The first ABA pronouncement, the 1908 Canons, based as they were on the work of Hoffman and to a greater degree Sharswood, was in fact more creed than code. The ABA made
little effort to encourage states to adopt the Canons as enforceable
standards.106 Even in the 1970s, as the ABA changed its course to a
more aggressive pressing on the states of the Model Code as a proposed enforceable code of conduct, the model urged was the familiar
combination of rules-the Disciplinary Rules-and aspirational
statements-the Ethical Considerations. A former faculty colleague
related the telling first day experience as a student in his late 1970s
professional responsibility course. The instructor explained his
trick for remembering the relative importance and roles of the Disciplinary Rules and the Ethical Considerations: he said that if a
lawyer did not heed the Disciplinary Rules (DR's), she would create
a "Darned Ruckus," but that she should only consider the Ethical
Considerations (EC's) if she wanted to be "Extra Careful." In effect,
the Model Code straddled the uncomfortable fence between a creedlike system and a code-like system. The structure of the Model
Code is itself a clear indication of the bar's ambivalence about enforceable rules and its continued clinging to the notion that lawyers
did not need ethics rules, they needed a voluntary creed to which a
pledge of good behavior could be made.
In truth, the Model Rules were the first g,ure code for lawyers.
AB the Kutak Commission drafted the Rules, and as the ABA debated, adopted and then urged them on the states, an important
feature of the Rules was the change to a more statute/restatementlike format from the awkward marriage of rule and aspiration that
had been the Model Code's format. Ironically, but perhaps not coincidentally, the ABA's move toward enforceable, mandatory rules
and away from aspirational statements has coincided with the
popularity of state and local bar adopted creeds. 108 Indeed, the ABA
105. The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1969) and CODE OF
CoNDUCT (1972) only furthered the retreat from a moral rationale of
ethics by abandoning the Code's Ethical Considerations.
106. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.2, at 54.
107. See id. § 2.6.4, at 60.
108. This same move has also coincided with a move toward "other law"
based ethics rules. As the rules have become enforceable, they have had to reference and account for the existence of coordinate areas of law that have always governed lawyer civil and criminal liability. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83,
§§ 4.1 to .2, at 146-50, § 6. 7.3, at 299, § 13.5.3, at 713 (agency); id. § 4.2, at 14854, §§ 6.3.1 to .3.2, at 250-52 (contract); id. § 13.3.6, at 698-701, §§ 13.5.2 to
.5.8, at 712-27 (fraud). "One perusing the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model Rules
will discover that, in the last analysis, little is required of lawyers that is not
already required by other law-the law of crimes, torts, contracts, property,
agency, evidence." Id. § 2.6.1, at 49.
JUDICIAL
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model creed is itself partly a replacement of the Code's lost aspirational side.

D.

The Rise of the Modern Creed
Chief Justice Warren Burger addressed the American Bar Association in 1984 and decried a decline in professionalism.109 Burger
enunciated a widespread perception that the Bar only lived up to
the minimum standards as articulated in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 110 The ABA's prompt response in the form of the
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism m validated
this perception,112 and essentially argued that the strictures of the
Model Rules, in and of themselves, did not create an acceptable
level of professionalism.113 Among other recommendations, the report advocated the adoption of non-enforceable ethical creeds that
would exhort the lawyer to conform to standards above the minimum standards of the Rules.114 In 1988, the ABA House of Delegates recommended that state and local bar associations adopt
creeds of professional conduct. 115 Subsequently, the ABA Torts and
Insurance Practice Section adopted such a creed.116 The ABA House
of Delegates also approved a creed created by the Young Lawyers'
Section called a Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism.117 The ABA
creed was similar to the 1989 Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate

109. Chief Justice Warren W. Burger, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of
the American Bar Association (Feb. 13-14, 1984), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471
(Feb. 28, 1984).
110. Id., reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984). In 1984, Justice Burger was speaking at a time when few states had actually adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA's House
of Delegates in 1983. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.4, at 62-63.
111. Blueprint, supra note 2.
112. See id. at 265 ("All segments of the Bar should: . . . [r]esolve to abide
by higher standards of conduct than the minimum required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.").
113. The ABA Blueprint for Professionalism attributed some of the shortcomings to external economic pressure, and thus stopped short of totally internalizing the blame. Id. at 257 ("Rhetoric about the 'special' character of the
profession remains, but the reality is that, as a matter of law, lawyers must
now face tough economic competition with respect to almost everything they
do.").
114. See id. at 296-97.
115. See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS MANuAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:401
(1994).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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for Professionalism.118 State and local bar associations quickly
110
seized the bait and began to draft non-binding creeds.
The interest in new creeds has grown dramatically in recent
years. While it has been said that the proliferation of creeds is a response to the "recent awareness of the civility crisis, or more appropriately, the shift in focus to the cure of the civility crisis,"120 the rise
in creed-need has also paralleled the change in ABA model standard focus from aspiration to rule orientation.
Much of the substance in the new wave of creeds mirrors the
work of Hoffman and Sharswood, whose work was more creed than
code. The irony of the Hoffman/Sharswood story is this: they wrote
a description of the ideal nineteenth century lawyer, to which lawyers should aspire; their work was used by the organized bar to
form the basis of the profession's first uniform ethics pronouncements; these ethics pronouncements in turn formed the basis for the
profession's first sets of enforceable rules; and traces of their work
are now evident in the organized bar's effort to revitalize aspiration
by way of the creeds.
II.

CREEDS, AS AsPIRATION, ARE NATURAL, GoOD AND INEVITABLE,
BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED

Because creeds are a nearly inevitable response to the profession's need to aspire, we will always have them. It is perfectly natural and healthy for a profession to aspire to something beyond enforceable norms. The best of such aspiration performs service for
the profession by encouraging conduct that both complies with the
enforceable norms and expresses the moral understanding, the
moral common-ground of the profession's members. 121
If creeds are to exist, they should not be enforceable for two reasons. First, making an aspiration enforceable converts it to a rule.
That conversion creates a new "aspiration gap," such as was created
by the ABA's move from aspiration to rule in the models. 122 New
forms of aspiration to replace the old will be found, and the cycle
will continue: aspiration should remain aspiration unless and until
its theme becomes incorporated through normal process into enforceable rules; enforcement without such a normal process conver118. See generally Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's
Creed: A Mandate for Professionalism, 10 REV. LITIG. 673 (1991) (discussing and
analyzing the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism).
119. As of late 1995, twenty-six states and sixty-two local bar associations
had adopted creeds. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Pro·
fessionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REV. 259, at 278 n.74 (1995).
120. Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Professionalism in the Practice ofLaw, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 537 n.49 (1994).
121. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 4-5 (1993).
122. For a discussion of the ABA's move from aspiration to rule in the models, see supra Part I. C.
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sion eliminates the benefit of aspiration. Second, the current creeds
should not be enforceable because they are based in part on a rationale that may be sensible for exhortation but that fails as a rationale for an enforceable rule: namely the rationale expressed
within many of the creeds saying essentially that, "I will be civil because doing so furthers my client's interests."123 Enforceable rules
are interpreted to apply when their rationales are furthered by the
results of their application. Because most uncivil lawyers' standards are based on the stated purpose of furthering their clients' interests,124 and because some uncivil behavior undoubtedly does further client interest, the current creeds will not be followed and
ought not apply to a wide range of conduct because the rule's stated
rationale is undermined by enforcement of the rule.
Unfortunately, there is a serious risk that the creeds will be
mistakenly enforced by courts and perhaps state bar disciplinary
authorities. Just as some courts used the Model Code's nonmandatory Ethical Considerations to support the imposition of discipline,125 some courts are edging toward the use of the creeds to
support various sanctions.
The creed most often cited in case law is the Texas Lawyer's
Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism, adopted November 7,
1989.126 Although the Creed's Order of Adoption states that the
rules are "primarily aspirational," the Creed has been used as a basis for penalties, such as sanctions, as some of the following cases
illustrate. 127
When a plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions and censure
against the defendant's attorney, a federal district court sanctioned
the attorney for intentionally misleading opposing counsel in order
to obtain ex parte interviews with opposing party witnesses. 128 The
Horner court cited both the Texas Lawyer's Creed and the section of

123. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989)
("The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals are committed to eliminating ... in our state ... abusive tactics which have surfaced in
many parts of our country. We believe such tactics are ... harmful to clients.").
124. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 23, at 48.
125. See, e.g., Committee on Prof! Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
ABs'n v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280, 285-86 (Iowa 1979).
126. See Cook, supra note 118, at 674-75.
127. See, e.g., McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482
(5th Cir. 1990). In McLeod, the defendant, proceeding for part of the case pro
se as a former client of the plaintiff-law firm, failed to respond, without good
cause, to discovery requests by the plaintiff. Id. at 1483-84. The appeals court,
upholding the district court's adoption of a magistrate's order of default judgment against the defendant, cited the specific rule of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure used by the magistrate-Rule 37-for default judgment. Id. at 148486. The appeals court also cited a section of The Texas Lawyers' Creed-A
Mandate for Professionalism, which requires attorneys to comply with reasonable discovery requests. Id. at 1486-87.
128. Homer v. Rowan Co., Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1994).

798

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

the Texas Disciplinary Rule prohibiting dishonesty with another attorney.129 Although the court referred only to the disciplinary rule
130
as "mandatory and [having] the status of law," the court cited the
Creed as a part of its reasoning toward the imposition of sanctions.131 The sanctions were attorneys' fees and relevant expenses
132
incurred by the plaintiff incident to the motion.
The same court had previously threatened application of the
133
Texas Lawyer's Creed as a sanctions rule in another case. Ruling
on various discovery motions filed in a patent infringement lawsuit,
the court, after granting the defendant's motion to compel the completion of a deposition, stated, "Counsel are admonished that their
failure to comply with the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for
Professionalism promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and adopted by this court will
result in monetary sanctions being imposed against counsel individually."134 The court's warning is effectively an enforcement of the
creed.
The Texas Lawyer's Creed was also referred to in two state
court decisions. Shortly after the adoption of the Creed, a concurring judge condemned the action of an attorney who served as both
counsel and witness for his client. 135 The attorney should be sanctioned, said the judge, by whatever punishment the Texas Su12reme
Court or the district grievance committee deems appropriate.1a6 The
judge cited the two-week old Creed as additional authority. 137 Although the judge did not say that sanctions should flow directly
from the Creed, he remarked that the Creed is a necessary response
to the increasing abuse in the legal system. 138
A pro se attorney seeking to recover damages and attorneys fees
from a former client was held to have acted unethically and to have
violated the Texas Lawyer's Creed by seeking a default judgment
against parties who had filed their answer under the wrong case
number, and who the attorney knew were represented by legal
counsel. 139 The court cited the Creed provision that states that a
lawyer will "'not take advantage, by causing any default or dismissal to be rendered, when [he or she knows] the identity of an op129. Id. at 603.
130. Id.
131. See id. (citing Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism
(1989)).
132. See id.
133. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 131 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Tex.
1990).
134. Id. at 674.
135. Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (Nye,
C.J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 531 n.3.
138. Id.
139. Owens v. Neely, 866 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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posing counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel's intention to proceed.'"140
The Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed and Guidelines for
Professional Courtesy, both adopted in 1987, were used as the basis
of a federal district court's adoption of standards of litigation conduct.141 The standards, in eleven sections, were taken nearly verba142
tim from sections of the two Dallas Bar Association documents.
Prefacing the newly adopted standards, the court commented on the
need for litigation standards, which, like creeds, are becoming increasingly necessary to combat lawyers' indirect attacks on the administration of justice.143 The court described its view of the need
for and appropriate role oflawyer creeds:
We address today a problem that, though of relatively recent
origin, is so pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of justice and to place litigation beyond the financial
reach of litigants. With alarming frequency, we find that
valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in resolving
unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers.
Judges and magistrates of this court are required to devote
substantial attention to refereeing abusive litigation tactics
that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction. Our
system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce resources to supervising matters that do not advance the resolution of the
merits of a case; nor can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive. 144
The courtesy creed discussed and adopted as an enforceable,
sanction-supporting code by the court was applied in a wrongful refusal to pay insurance claims case.145 The insurance company's lawyers filed a late brief, 146 arguably emulating their client's delaying
tactics that were the subject of the plaintiffs claim.147 Not only was
the brief filed late, but it was filed late without the lawyers either
requesting consent for the late filing from the plaintiff or seeking
leave of court to excuse the lateness. 146 The insurance company
lawyers had "clearly violated" the filing and leave of court requirements.149 The court was justifiably concerned about the company's
140. Id. at 720 n.2 (quoting Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism).
141. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284,287-88 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 286.
145. See id. at 285.
146. See id. at 286.
147. See id. at 285, 289.
148. See id. at 291.
149. Id.
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lawyers' neglect and tardiness. 150 When the plaintiffs lawyer moved
to strike the late filing, as the court's rules explicitly and understandably authorized them to do, 151 the court indicated its inclina162
tion to sanction the plaintiffs lawyers under the courtesy creed.
Speculating on its view that attorney conduct has deteriorated, the
court mentioned several possible causes: the increase in the size of
the bar has decreased collegiality; the legal profession has become
merely a business; and veteran attorneys have ceased to teach new
lawyers proper standards of conduct. 153
Unlike the Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed and Guidelines for Professional Courtesy, which do not mention sanctions or
other methods of enforcement, the district court in Dondi does discuss consequences of creed violations. Violations of these creeds
will result in "an appropriate response from the court, including the
range of sanctions the Fifth Circuit suggests in the Rule 11 context:
'a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand
in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or
other measures appropriate to the circumstances.'"154
Aspirational creeds should not be used to police lawyer conduct
that complies with the language of procedural rules such as Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, default judgment rules, or
filing deadlines enforcement rules. If a currently authorized practice, such as moving for default judgment when no answer has been
timely filed or moving to strike a late-filed brief, ought rather to be
prohibited, then the procedural . rules should themselves be
amended to reflect the measure of diligence with which lawyers
should be expected to enforce violations. Rule 11 is the best example: in 1993, it was amended to include a safe-harbor provision, requiring notice to opposing counsel and an opportunity to cure a defect before proceeding to court enforcement of Rule 11's strictures.165
If lawyers should be expected to notify opposing counsel that opposing counsel's brief or pleading is late before proceeding to seek
default judgment or late filing sanctions, then the appropriate rules
should be amended to reflect such a requirement. Lawyers ought to
be expected to seek enforcement of the rules as those rules are written rather than be expected to be a gentleman to opposing counsel
while compromising client interests. This is not a new, uncivil way
150. Id.
151. Naturally, as contemplated by the rules, in the first instance the option
of complaining about party misconduct such as late filings should rest with the
opposing party.
152. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287-89; see also Monroe Freedman, In the Matter
of Manners, LEGAL TIMEs, March 11, 1991, at 23 (recounting the Dondi court's
stated intention to impose sanctions on lawyers who violate the courtesy creed).
153. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286.
154. Id. at 288 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th
Cir. 1988}).
155. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
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of thinking. Warvelle described the late nineteenth and early twentieth century "general practice" as follows:
[I]t is the client's right to have his cause tried at the time set;
to have adverse pleadings filed within the time allowed; and to
insist that his attorney shall take every legal advantage the
case may afford, and this duty an attorney may not capriciously avoid nor is he at liberty to withdraw from the case
merely because his client insists upon the strict observance of
his rights. Whatever the feelings of counsel may be toward the
counsel for the other side, and however much he may desire to
accommodate him in matters of practice, he is yet under a
paramount duty to follow his client's instructions in all156matters pertaining to the legitimate conduct of the litigation.

The Creeds Should Not Be Enforceable Because Enforcement
Defeats the Aspirational Nature of the Creeds' Statements
There is a place for both aspiration and rule in the official organized bar and court statements about lawyer behavior. Mandatory rules are needed to provide reliable standards for the imposition of discipline and to give the public a set of standards by which
it is fair for them to expect lawyers to abide as a group. 157 Clients
and the public have a justifiable expectation that the licensing of
lawyers, like other professionals, includes an acceptance by the individual professional and an enforcement by the profession of a set
of concrete standards. These standards are not aspirational; they
are mandatory. 158
There is also a place for professional aspirational statements.
Aspirational pronouncements provide both a psychological159 and a
pragmatic, public relations benefit to the individual professional
and to the profession. The desire for these benefits are in significant measure responsible for the rise of the modern lawyer creeds;
they have replaced the aspirational "elements of the former organized bar ethics pronouncements when they were stripped first from

A.

156. WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 317, at 197; see also JOSEPH G. BALDWIN,
THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1854) (stating that older lawyers in the 1830s took
advantage of "quirks and quibbles" to prevail for their clients against those of
younger lawyers), reprinted in DENNIS R. NOLAN, READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF
THEAMERICANLEGALPROFESSION 113-15 (1980).
157. See, e.g., Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching
Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL Enuc. 1, 3 (1963).
158. For a discussion of the distinctions between aspirational and mandatory statements about professional conduct, see WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 1519, at 9-12. See also William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 217 (1996).
159. See, e.g., SmYLLE K ESCANOLA, AN APPLICATION OF THE LEVEL OF
AsPIRATION EXPERIMENT TO THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 4-6 (1948); .ARCHmALD 0.
HALLER & IRWIN W. MILLER, THE OCCUPATIONAL AsPIRATION SCALE: THEORY,
STRUCTURE AND CORRELATES 11 (1971).
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the Canons to the Model Code and then almost entirely eliminated
from the Model Code to the Model Rules. 160
To a very great extent, the modern creed is a sought-for replacement for the former, now lost, ABA sponsored aspirational
statements of the Canons and Code. To this extent, the modern
creed drafter must attend to the goals of that aspirational activity,
and courts and disciplinary bodies should refrain from enforcing
them. Once enforced, an aspirational statement becomes a rule and
then benefits derived from aspiration are lost. Inevitably, the profession needs and will have aspirations. Enforcing aspirations converts them to rules and leaves the need for aspiration wanting.

B. The Creeds Should Not Be Enforceable Because Their Rationale
Will Fail to Support Effective Rule Enforcement
There are two categories of rationales for the promises or commitments of a creed: moral rationales and pragmatic ones. Simply
and very generally stated, commitments based on moral rationales
discourage conduct that is wrong and encourage conduct that is
right; 161 pragmatic rationales discourage conduct that fails to further instrumental ends-it doesn't work-and encourage conduct
that does further instrumental ends-it works. 162
Creeds, dating back to the aspirational sections of the lawyer
oaths and Hoffman and Sharswood's descriptive writings, 163 even
while being aspirational have been based largely on the moral rationale and only occasionally on the pragmatic rationale. 164 Many
aspects of the modern creeds are unfortunately based in part on
pragmatic, specifically client-furthering rationales. For example,
the Virginia Lawyers' Creed requires the lawyer to promise to
"always recognize that uncivil conduct does not advance and may
compromise the rights of my clients."165 Lawyers who engage in uncivil conduct are not buying. Lawyers who engage in uncivil conduct do so primarily to further their clients'-and vicariously their
own-interests: "Hardball is vigorous advocacy for your client."166
"[T]he tug between doing right by your client and [doing] justice"
160. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 257-59.
161. For example, "I will not lie to my client because it is wrong to lie," or "I
am civil to opposing counsel because it is right to behave so."
162. For example, "I do not lie to my client because I will lose clients or because poor communication with my client will diminish the service I can provide for my client," or "I will be civil to opposing counsel because such conduct
will produce referrals to me or because such conduct will allow me to make a
better deal for my client or represent my client more effectively in court."
163. For a discussion of Hoffman's and Sharswood's writings as the first
American creeds, see supra Part I.B.
164. For a discussion of the moral basis of Hoffman and Sharswood's writings, see supra Part I.B.
165. Virginia Bar Association Creed (1996) (on file with author).
166. Goldberg, supra note 23, at 49.
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makes hardball a way oflife for the lawyer. 167 "[A]nyone ... [who]
cannot fulfill the prescribed obligations of a professional [including
the use of aggressive tactics for a client] should not undertake those
obligations."168 Lawyers treat litigation as "war" to impress clients,
send a message to opposing parties, and prove that the best defense
169
.
d cc.
IS a goo o.uense.
In a real way, the same pragmatic rationales that filtered
somewhat into Sharswood's work and that appear in many of today's creeds are in the same form that animated the early bar's client-interested emphasis on the advertising and contingent fee rules
in the ABA Canons. Just as Sharswood advises against engaging in
certain conduct because the conduct harms-at least fails to further-the lawyer's interests or harms-at least fails to further-the
client's interests, so may be seen the Canons' emphasis on prohibiting advertising and contingent fees. 170 The Canons drafters did
not advertise because it was unnecessary to their business interests;171 they did not advertise because doing so would not further
their or their clients' interests; they prohibited advertising and restrained contingent fees because doing so did further their business
interests and their clients' interests.
In his classic work, Holmes argued that it was the province of
the law to establish certain minimum enforceable standards of behavior.172 He argued that to enforce such minimum standards, the
law must address the "bad man."173 This "bad man," caring nothing
for the moral norms embodied in a stricture, is only concerned with
the material consequences of breach-he is only concerned with how
his behavior will materially affect his well-being. 174

167. ld. at 50.
168. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065 (1976).
169. Haig & Getman, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting a local bar president).
170. In some forms, of course, client-getting and contingent fees were always
prohibited as maintenance and champerty, but so were fraud and conversion
always prohibited. Some further explanation of the early bar's emphasis on
advertising and contingent fees other than the traditional criminal sanctions
for maintenance and champerty is needed to explain their prominence and distinction among topics addressed in the Canons. See generally Max Radin,
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935) (discussing the Canons in
relation to contingent fees and advertising).
171. They had essentially agreed not to compete with one another for clients. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 5, 190-91; WARVELLE, supra note 18, §
324, at 205-06.
172. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457
(1897), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167
(1920).
173. !d., reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
170 (1920).
174. See id., reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 170-71 (1920) (presenting the clearest statement of his thesis).
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Arguably, more lawyers are today modeled on Holmes' "bad
man."175 As such, their behavior must be governed to a greater extent by pragmatic interests than by moral suasion. This the ABA
has effectively done by moving its models from aspiration to enforceable rule. 176 Although the Model Rules are not generallylegislated norms of the type addressed by Holmes, the ABA essentially used Holmes' rationale and philosophy in promulgating the
new standards. 177 As with legislation, the Model Rules are an attempt by the ABA to establish enforceable minimum standards of
professional behavior; they adopt the assumption that lawyers are
"bad men."
This pragmatic, sanction/benefit-based rationale works quite
well as the basis for enforceable rules in the Model Rules, but it is
misplaced in the currently dominant creeds. At the heart of the
creed movement is an attempt by the organized bar to infuse lawyers with a "spirit" of professionalism.178 Each creed is an attempt
by the bar to exhort lawyers to move beyond the minimum standards as enunciated by the ABA. 179 It is, no doubt, an attempt to
change lawyers from "bad men" to "good men," such as the creed
180
promoters recall them to have been in earlier times. A pragmatic
basis for such a creed is self-defeating, for it embraces the notion
that one should act according to the material consequences of one's
behavior. If the creed's purpose is to encourage lawyers to act without reference to such self- or client-serving interests, then a pragmatic base will fail in both encouragement and enforcement. 181
Even if the purpose of the present creed movement was not to exhort attorneys to look beyond the material consequences of their actions, a pragmatic rationale would still be inappropriate in an enforcement environment. Enforceable rules are no better than their
rationales. These enforceable rules are no different. If an enforce-

175. See KRONMAN, supra note 121, at 126-27.
176. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 257-59 (stating that the ABA codes of
conduct have moved from aspirational terms to minimum-standards rules).
177. See id. at 259 ("[L]awyers have tended to take the rules more seriously
because of an increased fear of disciplinary prosecutions ....").
178. See id. at 257-58.
179. See id. at 259.
180. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393,
393 (1991) ("The recurrent movement to call or recall lawyers to professionalism is a moral argument."); see also id. at 397 ("I think that the A.B.A.'s unidentified ideal ... when it claims that to be professional is to be a good person,
is the American gentleman-lawyer.").
181. Self interest, such as the love of money has long (always?) been a
source of uncivil or unethical attorney conduct. A member of a Texas law faculty said in 1906, "I doubt whether a course of lectures on moral conduct will
revolutionize the morality of the Bar. The evil ... is not so much a professional
as an American fault. It has its source in our inordinate love for the almighty
dollar." 1906AALS Proceedings, supra note 7, at 10-11.
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able creed's rationale is pragmatic, then the creed's rules should not
apply when their pragmatic rationale would not be furthered by enforcement of the rule; the "bad man's" analysis would say that when
the pragmatic rationale fails, so does the rule. Whenever breach
would further the client's ends, the lawyer would-and should182
choose not to abide by a creed that was pragmatically based.
As
both Hoffman and Sharswood did, telling lawyers that discouraged
conduct is ineffective conduct may work well as a hortatory device,
but a like-based demand in an enforceable rule fails.
As the creeds become treated as if they were enforceable rules,
their rationale, of course, becomes critical. As with any other legal
rule, the rule is its rationale, and it may be expected that an enforceable lawyer rule will be appropriately ignored when its rationale fails to account for a particular proposed application of the rule.
A particular error of some of the creeds has been the tendency to
base them in part on client interests.183 Some creeds purport to rest
in part on the rationale that, as a lawyer, one should not be uncivil
with opponents because such conduct harms the client's interests. 184
Unfortunately, a creed based on such a rationale is doomed to fail.
It may be that uncivil, hardball conduct sometimes harms client interests, but lawyers who engage in such conduct do so largely because they believe that it furthers client interests. 185 When, as is almost inevitable, a lawyer believes that uncivil conduct will further
client interest, lawyers who would normally apply the rule will appropriately ignore it. Even the ABA, and not merely the bad apples
of the profession that the ABA has always complained of, stages
seminars designed to introduce lawyers to the methods of "Killer
186
These are tactics that lawyers, including leaders of the
Cross."
organized bar, believe benefit their clients at least some of the time.
182. See Simon, supra note 158, at 218-20.
183. "As a professional, I should always ... recognize that uncivil conduct
does not advance and may compromise the rights of my clients." The Virginia
Bar Association Creed (1996) (on file with author). "I will act at all times to
preserve the mutual feeling of camaraderie among lawyers ... because without
it my clients and I suffer." Pulaski County Bar Association Code of Professional Courtesy lj[ 23 (1986) (on file with author). "[E]xcessive zeal may be detrimental to my client's interests ...." ABA Torts and Insurance Practice Section Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism § C(1) (1988) (and numerous state and
local bar creeds modeled after the ABA model) (on file with author). "For us,
the idea that civility and candor stand in the way of desired results in fact inconsistent with the achievement oflong term goals, including successful results
for our clients." Los Angeles County Bar Association Litigation Guidelines
pmbl. (1989) (on file with author).
184. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989)
(stating that "abusive tactics" are harmful to clients).
185. For a discussion of the pragmatic rationale of lawyers' uncivil conduct,
see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
186. Killer Cross: A Look at New Techniques of Cross Examination and Impeachment in Criminal Cases, Conference sponsored by ABA Section on Criminal Justice (April3-5, 1992) (brochure on file with author).
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A moral rationale underlying such a rule, however, forces attention in the rule's application on the larger policy implications of the
conduct to which the rule is proposed to apply. Such a rule applies
to conduct in a way that furthers the "good" that is meant to result
from compliance, forcing consideration of the more appropriate material: when the reason for delay or obfuscation is to offset an unjust
imbalance of power, when it is to avoid greater moral harm than the
tactic will cause, when, as Freedman argues, for example, a truthful
witness's credibility is being attacked because that is the only path
to a just result/87 a creed provision should and would yield to this
greater good. The "good" that would be the rationale cannot be
based upon the "business-as-usual" ethic of the nineteenth century
organized bar, but on another more closely related to the state of the
profession today and the values of the society within which it exists.
ill. THE CURRENT CROP OF CREEDS ARE ILL-CONCEIVED
AND WILL FAIL

If creeds can be appropriately confined to aspirational topics, 188

remain unenforceable,189 and can be written to reflect the new
rather than the old common moral ground of the profession,190 they
will be valuable. Unfortunately, the current crop of creeds are not
confined to appropriate topics, have not effectively avoided merging
into enforceable standards, and are based on an outdated, common
moral ground.
A. The Creeds Should Confine Themselves to Appropriate Topics
for Aspiration
The current creeds contain a mixture of statements that simply
restate the current enforceable law governing lawyers, statements
that contradict or confuse the current enforceable law governing
lawyers, and statements that aspire to unenforceable but morally
sound ends. Only the last of these three should be included in a
creed.
Some of the provisions of the new creeds are mere restatements
of the current law governing lawyers. For example, some creeds include provisions like these from the Seventh Circuit's Standards:
"In civil actions, we will stipulate to relevant matters if they are
undisputed and if no good faith advocacy basis exists for not stipu-

187. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75
(1966).
188. For a discussion of creeds as aspirations, see infra Part III.A.
189. For a discussion of why creeds should remain unenforceable, see infra
Partiii.A.
190. For a discussion of rewriting creeds for the present time, see infra Part
III.C.
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lating"; 191 "We will base our discovery objections on a good faith belief in their merit and will not object solely for the purpose of with192
holding or delaying the disclosure of relevant information." These
do no good and some harm by diminishing the clarity of the enforceable norms that they paraphrase and by diminishing the force of the
enforceable norms by commingling the enforceable with the aspirational nature of the creed's main focus. No good, save that of public
relations, comes from requiring a lawyer to promise to do what the
law already requires.
Mandatory rules and aspirational expressions have an important relationship to one another. Some mandatory ethics rules implicate lawyer duties that aim unswervingly in one direction, while
others are an attempted balance among competing duties and goals,
all of which are appropriate duties and goals but none of which exists nor can be furthered in isolation from others. Only the former
are appropriate subjects for so-called "higher standards and aspiration." For example, "protect and do not misappropriate client
funds," 193 or "charge reasonable fees," 194 or "be diligent and competent"195 are all statements of mandatory lawyer rules that primarily
implicate a single duty. For such duties, aspiration is appropriate,
simple, and uncontroversial: for example, "Be extra careful with client funds," "be clear in communicating fee information to clients,"
and "prepare thoroughly and diligently" work well as aspirational
statements that encourage a·bit more than the rules require without burdening other competing duties. By contrast, most lawyer duties and rules represent a balance among competing legitimate duties. For example, revealing client fraud or prospective criminal
conduct implicates a balance between the duty to the public and the
duty to protect client confidences. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and the various state-adopted counterparts,
seek to locate a place where one duty should yield to the other.
When a so-called higher standard toward which a lawyer is urged to
aspire is imposed on such a rule, the balance is moved in one direction or the other. For such rules, aspiration beyond a solemn commitment to balance carefully the competing interests is aspiration
191. SEVENTH CmCUIT STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 'JI 9 (1997).
Query: Under Dondi, would it be uncivil to file a motion for sanctions against a
lawyer who would not so stipulate? For a discussion of Dondi, see supra notes
145-54 and accompanying text.
192. SEVENTH CmcUIT STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 'JI 9 (1997).
These are rough paraphrases of Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d) of the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILITY (1995).
193. A paraphrase of Rule 1.15 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIDILITY.
194. A paraphrase of Rule 1.5 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIDILITY.
195. A paraphrase of Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIDILITY.

808

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

toward one competing duty and away from another competing one.
As a result, such an exhortation in a creed is not a call for the fa196
miliar "higher standard than the minimum imposed by the rules";
rather, it is a call for a different balance of competing duties than is
currently mandated by the governing, enforceable rule. Even increased civility to fellow lawyers implicates a diminished zeal for
clients and public service duties.
The Dondi197 case is a prime example. When the defendants
failed to timely file their brief, the rule of procedure allowed the
198
plaintiff's lawyers to move the court for sanctions.
When the
plaintiff did so, the court threatened the plaintiff with sanctions for
failing to accommodate the defendant's counsel, essentially implicating a Rule 11-like safe harbor provision on the ground that it
would be more civil for plaintiff's lawyer to have asked defendants
about their intentions before filing the permitted motion with the
court.199 All the plaintiff did in Dondi was what the law permitted.
Even in the good old days, which the creeds seem intent on recreating, a client was permitted to insist that the lawyer take advantage of procedural defaults of an opposing party.200 Imposing an aspirational goal as a mandatory rule that strikes a balance between
competing duties can only alter the balance and create conflicting
standards of conduct that cannot both be satisfied by a lawyer.
Once venturing into these areas rather than the noncontroversial, single aim aspirations, a creed is outside its realm and is destined to fail by further confusing and muddling already-difficult
balance striking. Such an aspiration should rather be addressed to
efforts to amend the governing rule, if that aspiration identifies a
wiser, better balance. For example, the Professionalism Blueprint
encourages as aspiration an emphasis on the lawyer's role as officer
ofthe court.201 Such encouragement, iffound in a creed, necessarily
implicates a diminished zeal for the client. "Where the two conflict,
the duty to the system of justice must transcend the duty to the client."202 What of the balances struck by the mandatory rules? Are
they simply to melt away in favor of a more accommodating nature
to opposing counsel or the court?
B.

The Creeds Seek a Happily Lost Past
This move from creed to code in the ABA models is in part a reflection of the slowly diminishing stratification of the profession. As
196. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 265.
197. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
198. See id. at 285-86.
199. Id. at 291-92.
200. See WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 310, at 197.
201. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 264.
202. Id. at 280.

1997]

LAWYER CREEDS

809

the organized bar has lost full control over admission to the practice, it has recognized in its models that the former moral understanding-the "take care of one another before all other interests"
understanding that naturally results from the sort of in-breeding
that once dominated the profession-must be replaced. Up until
now, the profession has replaced the former moral common ground
203
with rules, a code, that is not aspirational as were the Canons, to
204
some extent the Model Code, and as are the creeds. An attempted
re-invigoration of the former understanding will fail because that
former moral understanding no longer prevails in the pluralist bar.
The former moral understanding cannot be divided away from its
sources. Too great a part of the former moral understanding was a
devotion to one's segment of the profession before the client and before public service, easy enough for those lawyers who were members of a club that would not compete with one another for clients
and who had no need of regularly attracting new clients through
other than social means. The former moral common ground was to
too great an extent wedded to the exclusivity of those who formed
and announced it. It exists as no more than memories of a golden
age, not unlike every other golden age: it is meant to pass and be
left behind when social advancements make it irrelevant to current
affairs. Only creeds that reflect a new moral understanding that is
based not on in-breeding, but on openness in law school admissions,
increasing openness in job placement, a pluralist profession, and acceptance of a variety of models of the "good lawyer," will find the
support of the new practitioner.
The profession that operated under the former moral understanding was one in which civility existed but was delivered only
within one's own practice cohort. In particular, outsiders of a wide
variety were the recipients not of civility but of scorn, ridicule,
abuse, and exclusion. The story of the organized bar's discrimination against women, African Americans, particular political groups,
and religious and geographic ethnic groups is well known by now,205
and I will summarize only a bit of it here. The point here, however,
is that the lost form of civility from that earlier age is too closely associated with the bar's serious sins, and was not given to all. That
form should not be sought. It was a form that encouraged taking
care of one's own socioeconomic/practice cohort, to the exclusion
from the practice cohort if not the practice itself those regarded as
unworthy because of their skin color, gender, religion, or ethnicity.
This is a form of civility that is no longer supported by the profession and therefore must be abandoned as a model for creed and aspiration once and for all.
203. See id. at 257.
204. See id. at 258.
205. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 7 (describing the bar's history of
discrimination); WARREN, supra note 31, at 303-10.
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From colonial times, outsiders were treated by more established
fellow lawyers not with civility but with scorn and exclusion. The
early Massachusetts bar, rabidly federalist, ostracized the handful
206
of anti-federalist lawyers who attempted to practice in the state.
One target of the New York federalist's exclusion fought back.
Thomas Addis Emmet, hated because he was Irish and because his
brother was an Irish patriot, ascertained the league formed to exclude him and "he did not wait for an attack. He proved the assailant. Whenever he met any of the league at the Bar, he assumed the
207
attitude of professional war, and he lost nothing by contact."
On the nineteenth century western frontier, older lawyers took
whatever advantage of younger lawyers that their experience would
allow. The older lawyers kept their experience "as a close monopoly," forcing younger lawyers to "run a gauntlet of technicalities" at
a "considerable tuition fee to be paid by [the young lawyers'] clients."208
In the early 1900s, the stratification in the bar developed between what Auerbach calls the -aristocrat lawyer-who represented
business-and the country lawyer-who represented individuals
and principles.209 Although the aristocrat and country lawyers had
differing education, wealth, and power, they shared a common culture, a common past. This common moral ground was the foundation for yet another stratification between these two groups of established lawyers and lawyers entering the profession as a result of
increased immigration, urbanization, and industrialization.210
In the twentieth century, the American Bar became stratified,
largely based on differences in race, color, sex, class, religion, education, educational opportunities, and social origins.211 Around the
turn of the century, law professors and corporate lawyers-the legal
"elite"-who dominated major professional institutions and associations, asserted their influence to define professional interests.
A paramount objective of this elite was to structure the legal
profession-its education, admissions, ethics, discipline, and
services-to serve certain political preferences at a time when
social change threatened the status and values of the groups to
which elite212lawyers belonged and whose interests they wished
to protect.

206. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 306.
207. ld. at 303 (quoting CHARLES G. HAINEs, MEMom OF THOMAS ADDISON
EMMET (1829)).
208. JOSEPH G. BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TIMES OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI: A
SERIES OF SKETCHES (1854), reprinted in NoLAN, supra note 156, at 113-15.
209. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 14-20.
210. See id. at 19-20.
211. See id. at 4.
212. Id.
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This struggle created a tension between elitism and democratization in the legal profession.213
With the proliferation of this new and undesirable "outsider"
class of attorneys, the legal "insiders"-the established lawyersattempted to preserve traditional values, primarily in corporate law
firms.
According to folklore, the doors of access to the legal profession
always swung open to anyone stung by ambition; lawyers
might prefer a restricted guild, but democratic realties required them to settle for less. But this is a half-truth, which
conceals the fact that doors to particular legal careers required
keys that were distributed according to race, religion, sex, and
ethnic1•ty.214
In fact, what the profession settled for was much less.
The power, prestige, and money flowing from corporate law
firms increased the desirability of work there. Yet barriers to nontraditional applicants were growing as well.215 At the turn of the
century, some law schools had admission restrictions based upon
race, sex, ethnicity, class, and family background.216 When law
firms began to develop a close relationship with law schools, the
elite corporate law firms had the most advantageous access to the
"best" law students at the "best" law schools.217 The recruitment
system channeled the legal talent to corporate firms which provided
services to a restricted clientele.218
The impetus behind the 1908 Canons was in large measure a
subterfuge for class and ethnic hostility. Protestant lawyers, disproportionately represented in the ABA, deemed unethical some of
the behavior of Jewish and Catholic new-immigrant solo lawyers of
lower-class origin.219 Ethical deviance was "less an attribute of an
act than a judgment by one group of lawyers about the inferiority of
another."220
The elite lawyers' influence was not limited to national associations like the ABA. State and local bar associations, faced with
rapid social change as well, also defended stability, order, and control.221 These bar associations often confined membership, as
Simeon Baldwin, a major force in founding of the ABA, said, "to
leading men or those of high promise."222 One method oflimiting ac213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 5-6.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 25.
See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 28-30.
See id. at 39.
See id. at 50.
Id.
See id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
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cess was to charge high fees and expect convention attendance and
participation in comm.ittees.223 As the associations spoke more and
more loudly on behalf of the entire profession, the profession's official view became that of the exclusive membership of the associations.
In 1922, William D. Guthrie, then-president of the New York
State Bar Association, opposed compulsory bar association membership. Such bar integration, he said, would democratize the bar at
224
the expense of "the elite of the Bar, the best of the Bar."
"[l]mmigrants and their progeny," Guthrie stated, were responsible
for "the difficult and grave problem and menace ... arising from the
admission to our bar in recent years oflarge numbers of undesirable
225
members."
Another New York example is even more illuminating:
In 1929, after a lengthy, publicized investigation in New York

into the evils of ambulance chasing, resulting in recommendations of disciplinary proceedings against seventy-four lawyers,
the chief counsel pointedly observed that some attorneys who
had testified 'could not speak the King's English correctly....
These men by character, by background, by environment, by
education were unfitted to be lawyers.' The only remedy, he
suggested, was a character examination, prior to law-school
admission, to eliminate those who lacked proper antecedents,
home environment, education, and social contacts. If such an
examination created a legal aristocracy, he told applauding
members of the New York State Bar Association, so be it. 226
Efforts to exclude outsiders at the time were not limited to New
York. In Pennsylvania, a member of a special 1925 committee appointed to recommend appropriate changes in the state's bar admission requirements succinctly stated his view about democratization
of the bar: "What concerns us ... is not keeping straight those who
are already members of the Bar, but keeping out of the profession
those whom we do not want."227 Raising educational requirements
could be goblematic, because "if we do that we keep our own possibly out."
Pennsylvania adopted the preceptor system that required a prospective member of the bar to obtain the assistance of a
current member as a sponsor in order to gain admission, with the
obvious effect of limiting the admission of outsiders.229 Speaking at
223. Seeid.
224. Id. at 121.
225. Id. at 121-22.
226. Id. at 48-49.
227. Id. at 125.
228. Id.
229. See generally Barry J. London, et al., Comment, Admission to the Pennsylvania Bar: The Need for Sweeping Change, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 945, 945-47
(1970). Note that the 1986 ABA Blueprint recommends a return to a modified
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a bar function in Virginia, the Vice President of the United States, a
member of the Indiana Bar, remarked that "we have permitted to
drag their green trunks across and along the planks at Ellis Island
thousands and hundreds of thousands of anarchists, revolutionists,
230
... fellows who propose to take charge of this republic of ours."
The ABA was, of course, also guilty of blatant efforts at exclusions. When the ABA in 1912 realized that it had admitted three
African-American lawyers to membership, the ABA passed a resolution revoking the admission. As the ABA reports state, since the
"settled practice of the Association has been to elect only white men
as members," and since the committee was "in ignorance of material
facts" such as the applicants' race, the matter was referred to the
entire association for consideration.231 The ABA, after receiving
pressure, readmitted the three lawyers but required all future applicants to identify themselves by race.232
One way the elite tried to exclude outsiders was through its attempt to set higher educational standards and higher bar admission
standards. The elite lawyers were troubled by the influx of immigrants and Jews into the legal profession-many of whom went to
law school by night or via correspondence courses. Night schools,
observed the Dean of the Wisconsin law school, enrolled "a very
233
large portion of foreign names. " An ABA committee recommended
that the character of the bar could be improved by raising educational standards in order to "purify the stream at the source."234
Easy access to the bar was also a problem for the elite, who
blamed easy access for the bar's inferior quality, which was blamed
for the denial of justice to the poor.235 The obvious "remedy" was to
restrict access to the bar.236 That urban immigrants, declared
George W. Wickersham, Attorney General to President Taft and
senior partner in a prestigious New York law firm, "with their imperfect conception of our institutions, should have an influence upon
the development of our constitution, and upon the growth of American institutions, is something that I shudder when I think of."237
Eastern European immigrants were described by one lawyer as possessing little fairness, justice, and honor; the result, he continued,
would threaten the Anglo-Saxon law of the land.238
preceptor approach to admission.
Blueprint, supra note 2, at 272
(recommending modified Pennsylvania preceptor approach).
230. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 132.
231. Special Report of the Executive Committee, in 37 A.B.A. REP. 93, 94-95
(1912).
232. See id. at 95.
233. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 100.
234. Id. at 113.
235. See id. at 114-16.
236. See id. at 116.
237. Id. at 115-16.
238. See id. at 107.
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A significant measure of the exclusion effort was directed toward Jews, who were disproportionately concentrated at the top of
their classes in law school but were also disproportionately concen239
trated at the bottom of the metropolitan bar. Law firm prejudice
against hiring Jews was justified by placing the blame on the prejudice of the firms' clients.240 Even law professors who helped to find
students employment recognized and often participated in prejudice
against Jewish students-from identifying students as Jews to
241
listing Jewishness as a handicap.

[W]ith some conspicuous exceptions to the contrary, Jewish
law review editors were excluded from partnerships in the
prestigious corporate law firms until after World War II;
blacks and women were outsiders until their token entry in the
late 1960's and early 1970's; and [by the mid 1970's] ethnic
minority group members ha[d] barely begun to gain entry.
Consequently, Protestant partners in these firms comprised
the professional elite; comprising it, they defined it; defining it,
they excluded non-whites, non-males, and non-Christians.
Academic achievement was necessary, but insufficient, for entry. Social origins, together with racial, sexual, and ethnic
identity, determined both the possibility of academic
achievement and the opportunity to reap its rewards. 242
Although the organized bar's efforts at exclusion retarded the
entry of outsiders into the profession, the eventual democratization
and diversification of the profession have remade the profession into
a diverse, pluralistic entity that would be hardly recognizable to
Hoffman, Sharswood, Baldwin, Drinker, Root, and the drafters of
the 1908 Canons.243 If the law is what the lawyers are, and the lawyers are what the law schools make them, then a profession is what
its members are, and its moral common ground is that of its members. Backward looking aspiration will fail.

C.

Searching for the New Moral Common Ground
To be effective, aspiration must be unenforceable and must be
based on the common moral ground of the aspirants. A nonenforceable norm or aspirational statement does not use formalized pressure; to be effective, it must utilize implicit pressure to encourage
239. See id. at 184.
240. See id. at 186.
241. Seeid.
242. Id. at 29-30.
243. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251-52; ABA Section of Legal Educ. and
Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and Professional Development-An
Educational Continuum, 11-27 (1992) (commonly known as the Macerate Report); Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69
WASH. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (1994); RICHARD L . .ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS tbls.
26-30 (1989).
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compliance. The lawyer must feel motivated to conform to the aspiration's message either by his or her own conscience or by the social
pressure exerted by his or her fellow professionals.
Such implicit pressure usually takes, and ought to take, the
form of moral consensus,244 and is uniquely appropriate when the
matter under consideration is an aspirational ideal. The more welltailored a creed is to existing professional standards, the more implicit pressure will be exerted on the individual lawyer. A creed
may never be able to exhort the truly "bad lawyer" to abide by its
dictates, but insofar as it guides and provides motivation for the
rest of the legal community, a moral rather than pragmatic foundation is a necessity. And in any event, the enforceable norms will
come from code not creed.
There has been a change in the moral common ground in the
profession, not all of which is for the worse. Much of this change is
the result ofthe inability of the bar to control entry and confine it as
it once did to the very whitest males.245 Where will the new moral
common ground lie? There is as yet no certain answer; there are
only signs pointing in particular directions. To be sure, to have
value, creeds must confine themselves to aspiration; and aspiration
is effectively a non-mandatory statement of the ideal. There are, as
well, models of the ideal that are being proposed.246 For example,
Kronman suggests a refreshing of the lawyer-statesman idealt7
Luban might favor the "moral activist lawyer" as the ideal;248
Freedman proposes an ideal of a more client favoring lawyer who
relies heavily on role morality and whose primary moral decision
occurs when he or she agrees to represent a particular client.249
Our new profession has existed for only twenty or so years,
hardly long enough to have expressed a change in moral common
ground in a manner that will stick and be dominant for the foreseeable future. It took some time when the business lawyer emerged
as the dominant form in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century for the changes to be made clear, but clear they were. The pluralist profession we now have may have to accept that there is no
single model of the "good lawyer," unless it is that the good lawyer is
the lawyer who is accepting of multiple models of good lawyering.
Perhaps that will emerge as the common moral ground, acceptance
of multiple models ofwhat makes good lawyering rather than insis244. See CAHN, supra note 102, at 47-48 (describing how moral consensus
provides for pressure to conform absent legal sanctions).
245. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251-52 (describing the increasing diversity of the American Bar).
246. See, e.g., Atkinson supra note 119, at 303-20 (identifying three models
of the good lawyer and identifying the one favored by the current creeds).
247. KRONMAN, supra note 121, at 3-4.
248. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxii (1988).
249. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4
(1975).
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tence on a single model that represents a description of the current
professional elite.
If Kronman is right and the former "Lost Lawyer"' ideals can be
refreshed,250 they must be done so in a way that will permit them to
function in a modern, diverse profession. The diversity should produce good for the profession. Kronman says the ideal of practical
wisdom is gone. 251 Perhaps he is right, perhaps not. The practical
wisdom of searching for a satisfying middle ground on which to base
decisions and moral consensus remains:252 it is this middle ground
that has moved. The middle has moved because there is a more
widely divergent range of views about what the profession is and
ought to be represented by those who are of the profession. The
wider range of views and experiences oflife now form the full landscape of the profession's membership; and unlike past times, some
of the leadership and power in the profession comes from those who
hold a broader view of the profession's mission. The new search is
for a new middle, a new middle informed by the new trends in
scholarship,253 new diversity at the bar, and new leaders who have
not agreed to refrain from competing with one another in favor of
joint competition with other, less powerful segments of the bar.
One manifestation of change that may foretell where the new
common moral ground will be found can be seen in the change in legal education, and particularly in legal scholarship; changes in legal
education have before been associated with changes in the profession's moral common ground. 254 In 1992, the Michigan Law Review
published an article by Judge Harry T. Edwards255 that was to mark
a significant moment in the changing character of legal scholarship.
Judge Edwards' article criticized in sharp tones the change he perceived in legal scholarship from the practical, the doctrinal, to the
impractical, antidoctrinal.256 The response was so overwhelming
and mixed that the Michigan Law Review devoted an issue to the
responses of some nineteen commentators.257 Included in that issue
was an update by Judge Edwards in which he detailed the
"extraordinary" reaction to his article, demonstrating the "deep and

250.
251.
252.
253.

KRoNMAN, supra note 121, at 4.

Id. at 2-3.

See id. at 3-5.
See id. at 242-67 (the new scholarship is a move away from the lawyer
ideal of practical wisdom).
254. See id. at 154 (describing the relationship between the adoption of the
Harvard method, and for that matter the university-ization of legal education
and the change in the profession of the late nineteenth, early twentieth century).

255. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
256. Id. at 34-42.
257. Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993).
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widespread concern" about the issues he had raised.
Judge Edwards and the responders, I believe, describe a phenomenon associated with a change in the profession's common moral ground.
259
Among the critics of Judge Edwards' article were Richard Posner
and Derrick Bell.260 Judge Posner had "deep disagreements" with
"Judge Edwards's double barreled blast at legal education and the
practice of law";261 Professor Bell "vigorously challenged some of
Judge Edwards's assumptions."262 Posner and Bell had not heretofore produced scholarship fitting neatly between 'Land M'; rather,
they represented widely divergent views on a variety of topics.
Nonetheless, they joined together in decrying Judge Edwards' demand for a narrower range of acceptable scholarship. Sanford
Levinson implicitly, and accurately, explained the phenomenon of
agreement between Bell and Posner by his criticism of Judge Edwards's failure to account for "pluralism in the legal academy."263
Broader views of acceptable scholarship are in part a result of
the legal academy's-and the profession's-move toward demographic consistency with the general population. This development
changes the moral common ground of the profession to make it more
reflective of American cultural diversity. A profession's values are
those of its members, especially those of its members with power.
The early twentieth century leaders of the profession knew this
well, and endeavored to keep the profession's membership "pristine"
264
in a wide variety ofways. The new profession, barely a generation
old, has begun to exert its influence on the profession's moral
ground. One way in which that influence is observable is by examination of the breadth of current legal scholarship. While it may be
more theoretical than Judge Edwards would like, it is undoubtedly
considerate of a wider variety of perspectives on American life than
has been true until the recent past.
Until relatively recent times, legal scholarship was within a
range from "L toM," rather than from "A to Z." It was largely doctrinal, meant to influence in a direct way the development of legal
doctrine by influencing courts and legislatures. Lawyers could
make immediate, direct use of law review articles in the crafting of
their arguments. Recently, a considerable portion of legal scholarship has turned away from the doctrinal toward the critical and
258. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2191-92 (1993).
259. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993).
260. Derrick Bell, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2025 (1993).
261. Posner, supra note 259, at 1921.
262. Bell, supra note 260, at 2025.
263. Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill ofParticulars, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2010, 2012-18 (1993).
264. For a discussion of discrimination in the ABA, see supra Part III.B.
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other genres. Some debate has surrounded the value of such scholarship,265 but an evaluation of its merit is not my focus. 266 It is, undeniably, one result of the organized bar's failure to control entry
into the profession and eventually the professorate. That such
writing is being done is the direct result of the greater diversity of
the profession.
The organized bar's values are not the values that are informing this scholarly vein. But these new values and the scholarship
they support and inform have begun and will continue to find their
way into the practice in the form of new ways of looking at legal
problems. From economic perspectives to race and gender perspectives, the best of these ideas will change the way the law and the
profession work. They will affect the moral understanding of the
profession.
The broader acceptable range of what constitutes the good
scholar may foretell a broader acceptable range of what constitutes
the good lawyer. There, perhaps, the new common moral ground
will lie, forming the basis for a new set of aspirations for the profession.
CONCLUSION

Aspiration is a good thing when it is unenforceable, when it is
confined to topics that are not complicated balances of competing interests, and when it is based on a moral rationale that fairly represents the common moral ground of the aspirants. The current wave
ofprofessionalism creeds fail on all three counts. Valuable aspiration can be pursued. Its basis must be a new common moral
ground, one that accepts and honors a wider range of acceptable
models of the good lawyer.

265. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
266. Like doctrinal scholarship, some of the new scholarship is excellent,
and some of it lacks value.

